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People diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) often have 
difficulties on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks involving social situations, such as ‘faux 
pas’. The objective of this study was to find the modality of presentation (visual, verbal, 
or mixed) that yields the best understanding of a ‘faux pas’, and the possible influence 
of other variables, including intelligence (IQ), age, and working memory. Thirty autistic 
children and 30 neurotypical children, all aged 7 to 12 years old and comparable in age 
and IQ, participated in this study. They were asked to resolve nine ‘faux pas’ stories 
(three per modality). Significant between-groups differences were found in the visual (t 
= 2.99, p = .004) and verbal modalities (t = 2.64, p = .011), such that the neurotypical 
(NT) group had higher scores than the ASD group. The ASD group’s comprehension 
was better via the mixed modality than the verbal modality (t = 2.48, p = .019). In 
addition, working memory had a bigger impact on Faux Pas understanding in cases of 
autism than in typical development (R
2
 explained between .19 and .28 of variance in 
Faux Pas test outcomes), and could therefore explain some of the difficulties previously 
reported in this area. Future research should include a measure of working memory and 
a control among the stimuli presented to test for group differences in faux pas 
understanding.  
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Understanding other people’s mental states – and one’s own – is central to 
understanding social behavior, enabling one to interact with and relate to other people. 
The ability that allows us to attribute, predict, and comprehend mental states is known 
as Theory of Mind (ToM; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). At first glance, its 
definition is simple, but it involves a series of intrinsic and predictive aspects that were 
previously referred to, almost mystically, as “mind reading”. To understand other 
people’s mental states means not only analyzing their intentions, plans, personality, 
knowledge, emotions, beliefs, and desires; it also requires an understanding of the social 
context and situation in which events occur (Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & 
Woodward, 2011).  
Much of our current understanding of ToM is based on studies of autism 
because autistic people show deficits in their mentalistic understanding of others. For 
that reason, prototypical ToM tasks have been widely administered to autistic 
individuals, for instance the classic “Sally-Anne” first-order false belief (FB) test 
pertaining to location change (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). As noted by Killen et al. 
(2011), this task involves limited social content, because there is no relationship 
between the characters (for example, if they are friends or strangers), or between the 
person and object. Nor does the task recognize the intention or motivation that leads the 
character to take action, or the emotions the action provokes. Change-of-location tasks 
such as Sally-Anne are referred to as cold, or cognitive ToM, and involve understanding 
thoughts and beliefs. According to the model proposed by Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, 
Aharon-Peretz, and Levkovitz (2010), cognitive ToM is a prerequisite to understanding 
situations that more closely resemble real-life social contexts where empathy and 
comprehension of emotional states and feelings are the focus – that is, hot or affective 
ToM. Fewer tests of advanced ToM contemplate ‘hot ToM’, including the well-known 
“Strange Stories” (Happé, 1994), and Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, 
Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), which is the main focus of the current study. 
Faux Pas, Theory of Mind, and Autism 
A faux pas can be defined as making a statement or taking an action that 
unintentionally turns out to be wrong, inopportune, or socially inappropriate. 
Therefore, understanding a faux pas means activating two types of mental state: 
Understanding that the person said/did something they should not have – cognitive ToM 
– and that the listener is insulted and hurt – affective ToM (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). In other words, to fully 
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understand a faux pas would require someone to, first, detect that the speaker either 
does not know or does not remember something (unintentional action), and second, to 
appreciate the emotional impact – usually negative – the comment or action may have 
on the listener (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Importantly, attention to specific details can 
be quite taxing on working memory (WM); for that reason, WM has been controlled for 
in previous studies of faux pas understanding (see Gregory et al., 2002; Zalla, Sav, 
Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009). 
Given the aforementioned important cognitive and emotional processes that 
mediate faux pas, autistic people often misunderstand social mores or misinterpret 
information, making them vulnerable to this type of situation in real life. Those 
difficulties are also apparent on advanced ToM reasoning tasks (Sotillo & Rivière, 
2001).  
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) created one of the most widely utilized tests of faux 
pas recognition. Several studies have administered it to autistic people and a 
neurotypical (NT) comparison group, especially in adults. Their findings indicate that 
judging different scenarios as they are presented is complex, especially when they 
involve accidental actions, due to ToM difficulties and respondents’ particular way of 
processing important information (González-Gadea et al., 2013; Pedreño, Pousa, 
Navarro, Pàmias, & Obiols, 2017; Spek, Scholte & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010; Zalla 
et al., 2009). According to Zalla et al. (2009), in which study 15 autistic adults and 15 
NT adults participated (MASD = 28 years; MNT = 27.8 years), a significant proportion of 
autistic adults answered incorrectly that the character acted intentionally, believing that 
the character had deliberately intended to humiliate or offend the other person.  
However, at its inception, the Faux Pas test was created to measure advanced 
ToM in schoolchildren or pre-adolescents. At 7 to 11 years of age, when comprehension 
of similar situations would mature, children are able to recognize the recursiveness of 
the mental states involved in a faux pas, and its relationship to intentions, beliefs, and 
emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Pearson & Pillow, 2016). In their study, the 
original authors of the Faux Pas test mentioned that autistic children had difficulty 
recognizing other people’s mental states. They found it hard to integrate all the 
information into a coherent picture, and comprehend the underlying psychological 
impact of a faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). In the same study, NT children (girls 
and boys) aged 9 and 11 years detected the faux pas, with no significant difference in 
the performance levels between NT girls and boys when they were 11 years old. 
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Likewise, Pearson and Pillow’s (2016) study of NT children (7, 8, 9 and 11 
years old) and NT adults found that after 9 years of age, participants were able to 
recognize the character/speaker’s ignorance (s/he does not know / s/he does not 
remember), a fact which the 7 and 8 years old did not detect.  
It is noteworthy that in both studies, the youngest NT children – 7 to 9 years old 
– were unable to recognize all the aspects involved in a faux pas, an ability which seems 
more mature from nine years of age onward. 
Working Memory Controls in Theory of Mind Tests 
Shifting our attention to working memory, authors such as Gregory et al. (2002) 
and Zalla et al. (2009) attempted to control the burden on memory and attention – given 
how demanding a faux pas story is – by placing the text of the faux pas story in front of 
the participant.  
Similar WM controls have been applied to other ToM tasks (mostly first-order 
FB tasks). Studies of patients with brain damage corroborate the finding that when ToM 
tasks increase the burden on WM or executive function (EF), performance drops 
significantly (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005). Other studies tried to reduce the 
likelihood of error by using visual stimuli to support WM (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & 
Knight, 1998), or shortened the tests to reduce the demands on EF (Apperly, Samson, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004).  
In light of the above, although Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1999) mentioned 
that their autistic participants do not have WM issues, it remains the case that 
comprehending a dialog- and narrative-based story can be complicated, given all the 
elements of verbal content one needs to remember. 
Verbal Faux Pas 
In studies by Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) and Zalla et al. (2009), participants 
listened to different faux pas stories, delivered vocally by the test administrator or on a 
cassette tape. This sort of verbal/auditory modality has been the most widely utilized, 
along with mixed (vignettes plus audio), due to the importance of the verbal content to 
overall comprehension of a faux pas story. The controversy, then, lies in whether or not 
the linguistic and WM demands of these more complex tasks influence participants’ 
responses. Along those lines, the first part of Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) study found 
that NT children’s mistakes on faux pas stories were not due to lack of comprehension 
or memory, despite a correlation between verbal mental age (VMA) and correctly 
completing the Faux Pas test. They remarked that the correlation could simply be the 
 6 
result of growing maturity, on both measures: older respondents perform better, so 
mistakes on the Faux Pas test should not be attributed to deficits in linguistic abilities, 
per se. Those authors conducted a second study as part of the same research, in which 
autistic children also participated. The authors reported that the significantly worse 
results in the ASD group were not due to their verbal profiles. Unlike Study 1, no 
correlation was found between VMA and Faux Pas test resolution, with both groups 
exhibiting similar VMA (no significant between-groups differences). 
Presentation Modality in Relation to Autism 
 There is evidence that autistic individuals are faster or more successful than NT 
participants at various visual tasks. Proof of that is that most materials for intervention, 
to date, are based on visual elements (Cohen & Sloan, 2007; Dettmer, Simpson, Myles, 
& Ganz, 2000; Hayes et al., 2010; Johnston, Nelson, Evans, & Palazolo, 2003). 
Similarly, in the research literature, autistic individuals score on par with, or outperform 
comparison groups on visual tasks related to perception and intelligence assessment. 
That is true of embedded figures (Almeida, Dickinson, Maybery, Badcock, & Badcock, 
2010), block design (Shah & Frith, 1993), or visual search (Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, 
Wolfe & Horowitz, 2017). It is what Blaser, Eglington, Carter, and Kaldy (2014) called 
the “ASD advantage” in visual tasks. Few studies have examined this visual advantage 
on more abstract or ecological reasoning tasks, likely because to attribute mental states 
and emotions to others, verbal information (intonation, pause, indecision, speech, etc.) 
can sometimes be even more illuminating than visual information (e.g., facial 
expressions) (see Wiseman’s 1995 study of lies in a NT population). In a study by 
Kleinman, Marciano, and Ault (2001), autistic adults and NT solved an advanced ToM 
task using two modalities: Visual (expression of the eyes) and verbal (tone of voice). As 
predicted, the group of autistic adults performed significantly worse than the 
comparison group in both modalities, being unable to attribute mental states in either 
case. 
Two of the studies most closely related to visual faux pas are Pierce, Glad, and 
Schreibman (1997), and Loveland, Pearson, Tunali-Kotoski, Ortegon, & Gibbs (2001), 
who explored schoolchildren and adolescents’ moral reasoning during social situations. 
Pierce et al. (1997) found that understanding social situations in moral terms (as correct 
or incorrect) was harder when autistic children had to attend to several stimuli; as such, 
a non-verbal scenario would be easier. Loveland et al. (2001) showed a series of videos 
depicting appropriate and inappropriate social interactions containing verbal stimuli 
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(speech) and non-verbal stimuli (non-narrative scenes). Following Pierce and team’s 
study, Loveland et al. (2001) ventured that the easiest scenes for autistic children and 
adults to comprehend would be non-verbal. The ASD group had significantly more 
difficulties than the comparison group identifying inappropriate behavior when the 
scenario was verbal. For both groups, judging conversations was harder than judging 
purely non-verbal interactions. 
Therefore, the visual “ASD advantage” should not just occur in studies of 
intelligence assessment; it would also be expected during ecological tasks (containing 
real-life scenarios). Conversely, verbal ecological tasks and situations with multiple 
stimuli to attend to can be more difficult to comprehend for autistic individuals. 
A Different Way to Process Information 
Further examining the possible influence of verbal or non-verbal presentation, it 
is worth asking if the so-called visual “ASD advantage” could be explained by Weak 
Central Coherence theory (WCC; Frith, 1989). WCC entails that autistic people fail to 
integrate information into an overall context; instead they focus preferentially on pieces 
of information in an isolated fashion. WCC is another plausible explanation for the 
superior performance of autistic individuals compared to NT people on tests involving 
fragmented elements, such as the block design or embedded figures tests, because such 
tasks favor local processing. This poses a question: Is there an advantage to visual 
problem solving when the stimulus is non-verbal because there are fewer stimuli to 
attend to, or due to a particular way of processing visual information (as in the block 
design test)? In fact, Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) proposed that deficient faux pas 
comprehension could be explained by how autistic people process information – 
textually citing WCC theory – such that it is laborious for them to reintegrate all the 
information and realize the true impact of a faux pas statement on the listener.  
In light of the above, ToM is definitely a complex process, and it is affected by 
many other cognitive processes. To ascertain whether extraneous variables such as 
presentation modality, WM, IQ and age influence comprehension on advanced ToM 
tasks, the present study tested the influence of these variables on performance in the 
Faux Pas task.  
In greater detail, the present study hypothesizes that (a) there will be significant 
differences between the groups of autistic and NT children on the Faux Pas test such 
that the NT group will score higher regardless of modality (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999); 
(b) we speculate that the most difficult modality for autistic people will be either verbal, 
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or mixed (verbal plus visual stimuli), and we expect significant differences according to 
modality in the ASD group such that their Faux Pas test outcomes are best in the purely 
visual modality (Loveland et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 1997); (c) we predict that while 
WM demands are to some degree controlled (Apperly et al., 2004; Apperly et al., 2005; 
Stone et al., 1998), WM will correlate with and explain variance in Faux Pas test 
outcomes in both groups. Furthermore, even though both groups are of a similar age and 
IQ, we predict that age will influence Faux Pas test outcomes since the study’s 




Sixty participants in total took part in this study, all of them enrolled in 
mainstream schools. They ranged in age from 84 to 145 months (7 years old - 12 years 
and 1 month old), with an average age of 113.63 months (SD = 18.71) – 9 years and 5 
months old. Thirty participants (5 girls and 25 boys) were diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) by one or more specialists or psychologists, using specific 
tests for differential diagnosis: The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; 
Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 2008) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview–Revised 
(ADI-R; Rutter, Le Couteur, & Lord, 2003). Another 30 participants (7 girls and 23 
boys) comprised the neurotypical (NT) group. We compared the two groups according 
to chronological age (in months); intelligence (IQ, range: 80–130); visual WM; and 
verbal WM. In addition, they all correctly completed the first-order FB ToM task (see 
Materials). Table 1 presents descriptive data and between-groups comparisons, which 
did not indicate significant differences on all measures.  
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
Materials 
All tests were administered in Spanish since all the participants speak Spanish. 
The tests were of intelligence, working memory (visual and verbal), false belief, and the 
Faux Pas test (visual, verbal, and mixed modality). 
Intelligence (IQ). To measure intelligence, we administered Sattler’s (1992) 
short-form adaptation of the WISC–III, Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children 
(Wechsler, 1991). WISC–III scores of the autistic children were redacted from their 
psychologist or neurology specialist’s report (maximum 2-year-old report). Total 
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WISC–III IQ scores in autistic children were highly correlated with the short form 
version (Sattler, 1992). Therefore, the NT group was administered the short-form 
version to get a reliable estimate of IQ in that group. The main goal was to guarantee 
that the two groups had comparable IQ levels.  
WM tasks were divided into visual and verbal modalities: 
Visual working memory. We administered the Reverse Memory subscale of the 
Leiter-R (Farmer, 2013), which measures memory capacity using a series of pictures. 
Respondents are asked to retain the image long enough to replicate the series by 
choosing the reverse order in which it was initially presented. For example, if the 
instructor points with his or her finger at “giraffe, frog, shoe,” the respondent should 
select “shoe, frog, giraffe.” 
Verbal working memory. We administered the Digit Span subtest of the 
Wechsler scale (WISC–IV) (Wechsler, 2005), using two variants: Forward and 
backward digits. 
First-order false belief ToM task. We administered an adaptation of the non-
verbal FB test. Its unexpected content is based on vignettes by de Villiers and de 
Villiers (2012), in which there is a relationship between characters (they seem to be 
brothers, and the “object” is an animal/pet). This supports Killen et al.’s (2011) line of 
reasoning about limited social content.  
Advanced theory-of-mind Faux Pas test. Nine faux pas stories were presented in 
random order using the E-prime multimedia computer program for touch-screen. For 
the purposes of the present study, these stories were analyzed according to presentation 
modality (see Table 2 and Appendices 1 and 2):  
Three visual stories. These were taken from García-Molina, Clemente-Estevan, 
Andrés-Roqueta, and Rodríguez (2016), and consisted of two vignettes recounting a 
situation of embarrassment or error. Questions appeared on a screen (without audio) and 
respondents answered visually.  
Three verbal stories. Created for the purposes of this study (see Appendix 2), 
these are based on Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) Faux Pas test. They include audio that 
recreates a situation through dialog and narration (different, very distinct voices were 
used). The questions were posed via audio (not written) and respondents answered 
verbally (the student answered out loud, and the program recorded their answers). 
Three mixed stories. These vignettes, taken from García-Molina et al. (2016), 
are also based on Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1999) Faux Pas test. They include vignettes, 
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written narrative, and audio to simultaneously recreate the full situation. Questions 
appeared on the screen (with audio) and respondents answered visually (similar to the 
visual stories test).  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
To control for working memory, on the visual- and mixed-modality tests, the 
pictures remained on the screen while the questions were asked and answered. During 
the verbal stories test, the written text was not placed in front of the participant, but they 
were verbally reminded of important details. For instance, while the respondent chose 
who said something strange, or something he/she should not have said, characters’ 
names were repeated along with their own voice: “If so, was it Joan (in the boy’s voice), 
Olga (the girl’s voice), or no one (narrator’s voice)?” 
Recognition test. At the end of each story, the same series of questions was 
asked – in the visual, verbal, or mixed modality. To answer, the child was asked to 
choose among different forced-choice answers.  
All responses to forced-choice questions (by touch or voice) were captured by 
the program E-prime and saved for later analysis.  
The questions appear below (see Appendix 3). For ease of comprehension, the 
correct answer is underlined; character A is the speaker of the faux pas, and B the 
listener. Every single question was asked, even if the student answered an item 
incorrectly. The six questions were presented in the same set order, but the stories 
appeared in random order. Answers were scored as follows: 0 = incorrect answer; 1 = 
correct answer.  
1. Faux pas detection: In the story, did someone say something they should 
not have said? (Yes/No)  
2. Identification of the character: If so, who? (A/B/Nobody) 
3. Emotion elicited: How must B have felt? (Good/Happy; Bad/Sad) 
4. Character’s intention: Do you think A meant to make B feel that way? 
(Yes/No) 
5. Character’s morality: Is A a good or bad person? (Good/Bad) 
6. Morality of the action: Was what A did right, or wrong? (Right/Wrong) 
7. Awareness or ignorance: Do you think A knew (information A does not 
have/is ignorant of)? (Yes/No) 
Procedure 
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After schools consented to participate, the boy/girl’s family or legal guardian 
signed the corresponding consent forms for their child to be evaluated. As a result of 
these meetings, 32 children with a formal autism diagnosis participated in the study, 
from five mainstream schools and one specialized center for neuropsychological 
assessment and treatment in Spain; an additional 32 NT children from the same schools 
and levels were selected by teachers according to established criteria. In the days that 
followed, they administered the FB and intelligence tests. Depending on their results 
(passing the first-order FB test and obtaining an IQ score over 80), we proceeded with 
the tests of working memory (verbal and visual) and the Faux Pas test (all modalities) in 
spaces specially set up for it: Clear of acoustic or visual distractions, with a table and 
two chairs. Assessment took between 75 and 90 minutes per participant and was split 
into two sessions. Four participants were excluded, not falling within the established 
parameters, and one did not attend the last session.  
Statistical Analysis 
The data were analyzed using the SPSS 24 statistical package. This sample had 
the characteristics necessary to conduct parametric analysis. According to Kolmogorov-
Smirnov’s test, the sample was normally distributed; Student’s t test for independent 
samples was used to observe between-groups differences; and paired t tests were carried 
out to determine if there were differences between modalities within each group – 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. With Hypothesis 3 in mind, we started by calculating correlations 
between WM, IQ, age, and Faux Pas test outcomes. Next, we undertook a step-wise 
regression procedure, adding in variables that were initially correlated. For all analyses, 
a p value of .05 was considered to establish statistical significance.  
Results 
Between-groups differences (ASD – NT) in Faux Pas Test outcomes. With regard 
to Hypothesis 1, between-groups differences were calculated in the three modalities of 
faux pas – visual, verbal, and mixed. Significant between-groups differences were 
found when the story’s presentation modality was visual and verbal, however 
differences were not significant in the mixed modality. See Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
Differences according to modality (visual, verbal or mixed) on Faux Pas test. 
With respect to Hypothesis 2 about the differences between modalities (visual, verbal, 
and mixed), results in the ASD group showed significant differences between verbal 
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and mixed modalities (with lower scores in the verbal modality). The NT group, on the 
other hand, displayed significant differences between visual and mixed modalities 
(scoring lower on mixed). See Table 4. 
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
Effect of WM and IQ on Faux Pas test. Prior to conducting the predictive 
analyses relevant to Hypothesis 3, we obtained bivariate correlations between WM, 
intelligence, age, and Faux Pas test results across three modalities.  
In the ASD group, significant correlations were found between: visual WM, and 
visual and mixed Faux Pas; verbal WM, and verbal, visual, and mixed Faux Pas; and 
intelligence (IQ), with visual and mixed Faux Pas.  
Conversely, in the group of NT children, we found no significant correlation 
among these variables (WM, IQ, and Faux Pas test). In this group, only one correlation 
was found, between participants’ age and mixed faux pas. 
<Insert Table 5 Here> 
Next, to determine which variables were independent predictors of Faux Pas test 
results (visual-, verbal-, and mixed-modality), we conducted multiple regression 
analyses using a step-wise procedure. However, this was only done in the group of 
autistic children, given their correlations between WM and IQ (see Table 5 for detailed 
correlations by group). We excluded linear regression data from the NT group, about 
age in relation to mixed Faux Pas, because the model was not found to be significant, 
F(1, 28) = 2.12; p = .156. 
Following the step-wise procedure cited above, significant regressions were 
found when the model included just the dependent variable and WM. All models 
excluded IQ. As Table 6 shows, 19% to 28% of variability in Faux Pas test results was 
explained by WM test outcomes (visual or verbal). See Table 6 for all these analyses. 
<Insert Table 6 Here> 
Discussion 
The present study was devised to answer certain questions: Via which modality 
do autistic children best understand faux pas? And do certain variables influence Faux 
Pas test outcomes?  
To begin with, we should point out that hypothesis 1 was consistent with our 
results in that autistic participants showed difficulty on mentalistic tasks (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1999; Zalla et al., 2009). In our study, autistic participants fared worse than NT 
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participants on the Faux Pas test regardless of modality. Significant differences were 
observed between groups when test presentation was purely visual or purely verbal. 
That fact reiterates that faux pas comprehension is challenging for autistic people; it is 
classified as requiring an advanced level of ToM, and involves cognitive as well as 
affective ToM sub-processes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the two groups scored very similarly in the mixed modality, where there 
were no differences between groups.  
Shifting our attention to Faux Pas test modalities, we shall discuss several novel 
findings that may have repercussions to related future research, and possible 
explanations closely related to information processing in autistic individuals. 
The Complexity of Verbal Stimuli for Autistic Individuals 
First of all, according to the so-called ASD advantage on visual tasks (Blaser et 
al., 2014) – especially on mentalistic tasks (Loveland et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 1997) –
Hypothesis 2 predicted that within the ASD group, the visual modality would have the 
best outcomes, and that differences might surface between the two modalities with 
verbal stimuli: Verbal and mixed. According to our data, the visual modality was easiest 
for children in the NT group, with significant differences compared to the mixed 
modality. Meanwhile, the highest score in the ASD group occurred in the mixed 
modality, and significant differences were only found compared to the verbal 
homologue. Contrary to expectations, in the ASD group, there were no differences 
between visual and verbal modalities, nor between visual and mixed. This difficulty 
with verbal story comprehension for the ASD group could be explained by the high 
imaginative and symbolic demands of deducing what is happening in a purely verbal 
scenario, as in a telephone conversation. An important criterion in autism diagnosis is 
that imagination appears to be limited (see Rutter et al., 2003). Meanwhile, that skill 
was performed by NT participants without issue in the verbal modality of the Faux Pas 
test.  
Another possible explanation for autistic children scoring lower than the NT 
group in the verbal modality could be that autistic children found it difficult to integrate 
and understand all the information provided (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Moreover, the 
linguistic and WM burden of comprehending verbal fragments (presented as dialog) in a 
Faux Pas test, with no other type of support, may have affected overall comprehension 
of the verbal stories (Apperly et al., 2004; Apperly et al., 2005). However, importantly, 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) argued that between-groups differences on the Faux Pas test 
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could not be attributed to their respective linguistic ability; rather, the ASD group’s 
difficulty comprehending a faux pas story might be explained by how they process the 
information and comprehend it cohesively, as a whole. That proposal would be 
supported by WCC theory in autism (Frith, 1989), that is, recognizing the parts without 
comprehending the big picture. For instance, in the verbal Faux Pas modality, pieces of 
audio from a dialog (verbal fragments) must lead the participant to make sense of an 
overall story. NT participants, however, had scarcely any problem solving the Faux Pas 
questions in verbal or visual modalities. They were able to recognize all the defining 
aspects of faux pas, understanding it – based on all the information together – as one 
entity. Additional theoretical support for these results is the theory of neural complexity, 
which also postulates that autistic people are good at local processing, whereas global 
processing is impaired. The same theory proposes that auditory processing in autistic 
people is the result of better perception when auditory stimuli are simple and low-level. 
However, there is altered perception when the auditory information is more complex 
(Lin, Shirama, Kato, & Kashino, 2017). Along those lines, Lin et al.’s (2017) study 
revealed that autistic people tend to show atypical responses to social auditory stimuli, 
namely, voices. For example, they show less preference for their mothers’ speech, and 
lower attention when someone calls their name, compared to NT children. Moreover, 
autistic adults often have difficulty perceiving prosody.   
Therefore, another possible explanation for the ASD group’s results in the verbal 
modality – in addition to what Baron-Cohen and team argued in their seminal study – 
could be reduced attention to, or altered perception of, auditory information. Difficulty 
recognizing voices and interpreting dialog would make that modality more challenging 
for autistic individuals. 
Working Memory in Predicting Faux Pas Test Outcomes 
One of the most striking results is the correlation and prediction displayed by 
WM in all modalities of the Faux Pas test, specifically, solely in the group of autistic 
children, and likewise for IQ. These predictive analysis results support Hypothesis 3, 
since visual and verbal WM would influence Faux Pas test outcomes, despite our 
attempt to reduce the demands on memory – as other studies have suggested the same to 
reduce the effect of WM (Apperly et al., 2004; Apperly et al., 2005; Stone et al., 1998). 
Whereas in the NT group, WM did not correlate with Faux Pas results in any modality, 
in the ASD group, visual and verbal WM explained 19% to 28% of variability in Faux 
Pas test outcomes (verbal, visual, mixed), and IQ was excluded from all the regression 
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models. In terms of age, although previous studies reported improved mentalistic test 
outcomes in older children - over 9 years old (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Pearson & 
Pillow, 2016), in our study, age correlated only with mixed-modality Faux Pas results in 
the NT group. Since the predictive model was not significant, it was not included in our 
detailed analyses. Therefore, our participants’ age (7 to 12 years) did not affect their 
answers on the Faux Pas test. The original age range of the test on which our study is 
based was children up to seven years old. Therefore, our results were in line with the 
Baron-Cohen study’s preliminary sample. 
One last possible explanation for the unique influence of WM on remembering 
central aspects of faux pas in the ASD group is that autistic individuals process 
information and abstractly assign meaning differently. This is consistent with WCC 
theory (Frith, 1989). Its premise is that autistic people do not integrate information as an 
overall whole – generally – but instead attend to and preferentially remember small 
visual (face) or verbal elements (a sentence) separately – locally (see Happé & Frith, 
2006). Along those lines, autistic participants would rely more heavily on WM than the 
NT group to remember the complete story and answer the test’s comprehension 
questions. Consequently, comprehending and memorizing contingent information as 
separate elements (without generalizing to form overall meaning) might be hindering 
overall memory of the correct understanding of the story. On a similar note, Baron-
Cohen and his team (1999) specifically controlled “parroting,” because autistic children 
tend to resort to echolalia or repeat a particular fragment – usually the last thing they 
were listening to with no concrete meaning. It would stand to reason that “parroting” 
might also occur during the mental process of listening to the story and the 
corresponding questions, mentally repeating a particular fragment, and entering into a 
loop, impeding the person from completely construing the story’s overall meaning. 
It is certainly the case, as Baron-Cohen and his team concluded, that our results 
shed some light on the possibility that how autistic people process information may 
influence their outcomes in situations requiring mentalistic reasoning. Our study 
contributes the novel finding that WM and presentation modality influence outcomes on 
advanced ToM testing. 
Some limitations of the present study should be considered. The first concerns 
the small sample size of our groups. The second issue was the lack of validated 
measures of Verbal Faux Pas stories, although all the stories were created following the 
same structure as Baron-Cohen et al. (1999). In addition, for future research, it would be 
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useful to find a more robust way to control WM, better than the measures used in other 
studies (placing the text in front of the participant) and ours (reminders while the 
questions were asked). Likely, attending to different stimuli at the same time (reading 
and listening), or to additional information (voices, background noise, etc.), could affect 
the final outcome. Finally, it would be interesting to administer another presentation 
modality. For example, stories of faux pas in video format could capture variables 
closer to real-life situations, such as action, gestures, glances, and body language. 
This study provides empirical evidence and practical implications for autistic 
children and adolescents. On the one hand, the study tries to answer the question: What 
type of presentation is most beneficial to autistic children in advanced ToM tasks, as in 
the case of Faux Pas test? Results indicate the mixed format (a mix with verbal and 
visual information) would be the most suitable to access visual information – more 
closely related to affective ToM – (faces, emotions, details, etc.) and verbal information 
– related to cognitive ToM – (tone of voice, prosody, dialog, etc.), which are both 
necessary subprocesses to completely comprehend a faux pas. On the other hand, the 
present study emphasizes the creation of new stories and presentation modalities, to 
offer new resources to this field of study and practice. More materials based on 
advanced ToM are needed for assessment as well as intervention purposes. This study’s 
findings also underscore the importance of WM and the attentional demands of verbal 
or nonverbal stimuli during tasks based on social situations. Therefore, future 
intervention tools or activities should consider including reminders to enable the 
participant to follow the thread of the story. 
Our findings could be the first step in creating new intervention materials that 
include simple visual stimuli rather than purely verbal stimuli to improve 
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Table 1.  
Participants’ Descriptive Data 
 








 % CI 
Age (months) 112.87 (18.58) 114.40 (19.11) .32 .75 –.11 [-8.21 – 11.28] 
Intelligence (IQ) 102.83 (14.23) 107.03 (12.02) 1.23 .22 –.32 [-2.61 – 11.01] 
Visual WM 9.59 (3.26) 10.57 (1.94) 1.41 .16 –.37 [-4.12 – 2.37] 
Verbal WM 9.69 (3.64) 11.33 (2.93) 1.92 .06 –.50 [-.07 – 3.36] 
Note.
 a
d = Effect size calculated using the Cohen’s d formula. 
b




Table 2.  
Story Classification by Modality and Error 
 
Error due to… Visual Verbal Mixed 
Confusion Ball Hair Toy airplane 
Lack of information Gift Exam Apple pie 




Table 3.  



















 % CI  
Visual 15.60 (3.17) 14 (7–21) 
 
17.73 (2.27) 8 (13–21) 2.99 .004 –.77 [.71 – 3.56] 
Verbal 15.10 (2.98) 12 (9–21) 
 
17.03 (2.70) 10 (11–21) 2.64 .011 –.68 [.47 – 3.40] 
Mixed 16.13 (2.85) 10 (11–21) 
 
16.33 (3.04) 11 (10–21) .26 .794 –.07 [-1.32 – 1.72] 
Note.
 a
Maximum score 21. 
b
d = Effect size calculated using the Cohen’s d formula. 
c





Table 4.  





Modality M (SD) t p 
 
M (SD) t p 




 17.73 (2.27) 
17.03 (2.70) 
1.36 .184 




 17.73 (2.27) 
16.33 (3.04) 
2.45 .021 











Table 5.  
Bivariate Correlations between Faux Pas, Visual WM, Verbal WM, and IQ in the ASD 
and NT Groups 
 
  ASD    NT  
 Faux pas  Faux pas 

















  .19 .18 .26 




correlation is significant to the level of .05. 
**
 correlation is significant to the level of .01.  
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Table 6.  
Summary of the Regression Analysis by Step-wise Procedure to Predict Faux Pas Test 




b SE b β t R
2
 
Visual Modality       





 11.58 1.71 - 6.77
***
  
 .43 .17 .44 2.53
*
 .19 
  Model 2       
Constant 8.71
*
 11.50 1.51 - 7.59
***
  
Verbal WM  .43 .15 .49 2.95
*
 .24 























Verbal Modality       


















Mixed Modality       
  Model 1       
Constant 6.12
*
 12.58 1.55  8.12
***
  
Visual WM  .38 .15 .43 2.47
*
 .19 























Note. F = F value (ANOVA); b = unstandardized βeta; SE b = standard error for the 
unstandardized βeta; β = standardized βeta coefficient; t = t test statistics; R
2
 = coefficient of 
determination. 
*
p > .05. 
**
p > .01. 
***




Appendix 1 (Spanish) 
Examples of faux pas stories 
Visual faux pas story “Ball” 
<Insert Figure 1 Here> 
Verbal faux pas story “Birthday”. Era el cumpleaños de Olga, y su novio Joan, 
le estaba organizando una fiesta sorpresa. Ana estaba ayudándole. Entonces, Joan le 
recordó a Ana: (Voz de Joan) «Y recuerda Ana, que Olga no debe saber nada de lo de su 
fiesta de cumpleaños sorpresa para mañana». «Sí, sí, Joan. No te preocupes». Unas 
horas más tarde… Voz de Ana: «Hola Olga, ¿cómo estás?... Bueno, tengo prisa. ¡Nos 
vemos mañana!» Voz de Olga: – «¿Mañana?». Voz de Ana: – «Sí, en tu fiesta de 
cumple. Nada, te dejo que voy muy apurada». 
Mixed faux pas story “Apple pie”. Inés ayudó a su mamá a hacer un pastel de 
manzana para su tío, que vino a visitarlas. Ella lo llevó hasta su tío y le dijo: «Lo hice 
solo para ti». «Mmm», se le ve buena pinta... —respondió el tío Tomás, «Me encantan 
los pasteles, el único que no me gusta nada, nada, ¡es el de manzana!». 
<Insert Figure 2 Here> 
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Appendix 2 (Spanish) 
Verbal faux pas stories 
“Exam” story. Se encontraron en el patio de la escuela Lorenzo y Marta, y 
Lorenzo le preguntó a Marta: «Hola Marta, ¿qué tal el examen?». Voz de Marta: «Fatal, 
he sacado un 3 sobre 10». Voz de Lorenzo: «Ay, pobre… Mira, ahí está Helena, vamos 
a preguntarle… Hola Helena, ¿qué tal tu examen?» Voz de Helena: «Buah, genial, un 10 
¡es que tienes que ser muy tonto para no aprobar un examen tan fácil!». 
“Hair” story. En la cola del supermercado había dos chicos mirando a la 
persona que estaba delante. Esa persona era muy alta y tenía una melena larguísima. Un 
amigo, le dijo al otro: «Llevo diez minutos mirándola. Mírala, está ahí, ¿la ves? ¡Qué 
melena tan larga, qué piernas tan esbeltas! Es altísima. Uf, me acabo de enamorar, tengo 
que ir a hablar con ella. Es la mujer de mi vida». Unos segundos más tarde… «Disculpa 
guapa…» Voz de hombre muy grave: «¿Sí? ¿Querías algo?». 
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Appendix 3 (Spanish) 
1. Detección del enunciado equívoco: ¿Alguien dijo algo que no debería haber 
dicho? (Si/No)  
In the story, did someone say something they should not have said? (Yes/No) 
2. Reconocimiento del personaje: En ese caso, ¿quién? (A/B/Nadie)  
If so, who? (A/B/Nobody) 
3. Emoción provocada: ¿Cómo se habrá sentido B? (Bien/Contento; 
Mal/Triste) 
How must B have felt? (Good/Happy; Bad/Sad) 
4. Intención del personaje: ¿Tú crees que A quería hacerle sentir así? (Si/No)  
Do you think A meant to make B feel that way? (Yes/No) 
5. Moralidad del personaje: ¿A es bueno o malo? (Bueno/Malo) 
Is A a good or bad person? (Good/Bad) 
6. Moralidad del acto: ¿Lo que hizo A está bien o está mal? (Bien/Mal)  
Was what A did right, or wrong? (Right/Wrong) 
7. Ignorancia: ¿Crees que A sabía (información que A no tiene/ignorancia)? 
(Sí/No)   











Figure 2. Mixed Faux Pas Story “Apple Pie”. 
